The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Carina Ventures LLC v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation offers a stark narrative about the perils of third-party litigation funding. [1] What began as Sysco’s antitrust claims ultimately evolved into a procedural battle between Sysco and its funder, Burford Capital. When Sysco sought to settle the underlying disputes for a reported global figure of USD 50 million, Burford exercised its contractual right under Capital Provision Agreement (“CPA”) to withhold consent. What followed was an emergency relief before an arbitral tribunal and ultimately a preliminary injunction preventing Sysco from settling. Months later, Burford and Sysco resolved their own dispute, with Sysco assigning its claims to Burford’s affiliate, Carina Ventures, the appellant in the case under analysis.
What matters for this piece, is the concurring judgment of Judge Maldonado and her blistering statement in the judgment:
“I say all of this to flag that Carina’s—that is, Burford’s—appeal before us is motivated far more by its speculative financial investment than by a desire to seek justice for Sysco, the true injured party. Having turned the courtroom into a trading floor, and calculated that continued litigation was more profitable than settlement, Burford wrested total control over the settlement of Sysco’s claims. And but for this legal maneuvering, this litigation could have been resolved long ago. This case is a cautionary tale to any party who seeks to fund its litigation through a third party.”
Concurring Judgment of Judge Maldonado
It is a powerful passage, and one that will no doubt be quoted often by critics of litigation finance. Yet what the opinion does not fully confront is the uncomfortable counterfactual: without funding, there may have been no litigation at all.
Complex antitrust cases in the United States routinely demand thousands of lawyer hours at rates that make access to justice illusory for even well-resourced corporates, let alone smaller claimants. Anyone can do the maths. The risk is absolute. If the case fails, the funder loses everything. That risk is not theoretical—it is the economic foundation of the industry. To describe litigation funding as mere speculation, without acknowledging the benefits it provides, is to tell only half the story.
Not only that, but a funder is not merely a source of capital. Over time, leading funders have accumulated litigation expertise that often rivals that of the legal teams they support—insight into case selection, procedural strategy, jurisdictional risk, and settlement dynamics shaped by years of exposure to complex disputes. This contribution is largely invisible from the outside. That added value is not easily priced, but it is real, and it frequently improves—not undermines—the quality and efficiency of litigation.
None of these excuses overreach the contractual limits and shifting the funder’s role from enabling litigation to controlling it discretionally in a way that the detriments the claimant’s interest. Control rights must be scrutinized, and funders should not displace the claimant’s voice, but framing this case solely as a morality play about financial engineering in the courtroom risks obscuring a more nuanced reality: litigation funding exists because, in many jurisdictions, justice is priced beyond reach. Until that changes, funding will remain not a cautionary tale, but a necessary one.
“Balance in the Force, there must be.” – Yoda
[1] United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, No. 25-1110, In Re: Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litigation, Carina Ventures Llc, (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, (Defendant-Appellee).